Facts
The original plaintiff instituted a partition suit seeking a ¼ share in ancestral property. During the pendency of the suit, a compromise petition was accepted by the trial court on 22 February 1994 and a final decree was drawn on 27 May 1997. Nearly twenty-five years later, the legal heirs of Defendant No.5 sought recall of the compromise decree, alleging that it had been obtained fraudulently, that Defendant No.5 had never signed the compromise, and that his counsel had acted without authority. The Trial Court set aside the compromise decree under S.151 CPC, and the High Court affirmed the order. The plaintiffs' legal heirs appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issues Framed
Whether the compromise accepted by the Civil Court on 22 February 1994 was in accordance with Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC.
Court's Reasoning
(a) Legal Rule
The Court held that after the 1976 amendment, Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC mandates that a compromise must be in writing and signed by the parties. Although counsel may sign on behalf of a party, such authority must be supported by express authorisation or justified by exceptional circumstances. The court is not a mere recorder of settlements but must satisfy itself that the compromise is lawful and voluntary.
(b) Precedents Relied Upon
The Court relied upon Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel, Som Dev v. Rati Ram, Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi, Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India, Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh, Himalayan Coop. Group Housing Society v. Balwan Singh, Prasanta Kumar Sahoo v. Charulata Sahoo, and Navratan Lal Sharma v. Radha Mohan Sharma to reiterate that express authority is the norm and that a compromise decree may be recalled where statutory requirements are not fulfilled.
(c) Application
The compromise petition did not bear Defendant No.5's signature, and there was no material establishing that his counsel had express authority or that any exigent circumstance justified acting without instructions. Consequently, the essential requirement of voluntary consent under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC was absent, rendering the compromise decree contrary to law.
(d) Treatment of Counterarguments
The appellants relied on the extraordinary delay of twenty-five years. The Court rejected this contention, observing that limitation cannot be used to perpetuate an illegal compromise, particularly where fraud is alleged and substantial property rights are affected. Since foundational facts remained disputed, the matter required adjudication through a full trial.
Held
The appeal was dismissed. The orders setting aside the compromise decree were affirmed, and the partition suit was directed to proceed to trial on merits.
Ratio
A compromise decree under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC is valid only when founded upon a written compromise voluntarily signed by the parties or by a duly authorised representative; absence of express authority to counsel renders the decree liable to be recalled, and delay alone cannot validate an otherwise illegal compromise.
Case Details
Citation: 2026 INSC 662
Decided on: 1 July 2026
Case Title: Krishna Kumar Ojha & Ors. v. Jitendra Chaudhary & Ors.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Sanjay Karol, J.; Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, J.