The Supreme Court held that striking off a tenant’s defence under Order XV Rule 5 CPC is a drastic discretionary measure that cannot be applied mechanically without determining the “first date of hearing” and examining whether the default was wilful or bona fide.

on

Facts

The appellants-landlords instituted an eviction and arrears recovery suit against the respondent-tenant in respect of commercial premises at Kanpur under s. 106 Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The respondent allegedly defaulted in payment of rent after October 2020.

During pendency of the suit, the landlords moved an application under Order XV Rule 5 CPC seeking striking off of the tenant’s defence on the ground that the tenant had failed to deposit admitted rent, damages, and costs within the stipulated period. The Trial Court allowed the application and struck off the defence.

The Allahabad High Court, in revision, interfered with the order and granted the tenant an opportunity to deposit rent subject to conditions. When the tenant again defaulted within the extended period, the High Court nevertheless condoned the delay and further extended time for compliance. The landlords challenged both orders before the Supreme Court.

Issues Framed
Whether the tenant’s defence could validly be struck off under Order XV Rule 5 CPC, and whether the High Court was justified in extending time for deposit despite earlier conditional directions.

Court’s Reasoning

(a) The Court reiterated that Order XV Rule 5 CPC aims to prevent tenants from continuing in possession without complying with their obligation to deposit admitted rent during pendency of litigation. However, the power to strike off defence is penal in nature and cannot be exercised mechanically.

(b) Relying on Bimal Chand Jain v. Sri Gopal Agarwal, the Court held that although the provision appears mandatory, it vests judicial discretion in the court. The tenant possesses a statutory right to explain the default, and the court must consider whether sufficient cause exists before imposing the drastic consequence of striking off defence.

(c) Referring to Santosh Mehta v. Om Prakash, the Court emphasized that striking off defence is reserved for “grossly recalcitrant situations” involving wilful or deliberate default. Mere delay or procedural lapse does not automatically justify the penalty.

(d) The Court found that the Trial Court had failed to adequately determine foundational requirements, particularly the “first date of hearing.” Citing Siraj Ahmad Siddiqui v. Prem Nath Kapoor, it held that the expression refers to the date on which the court applies its mind to the controversy, ordinarily at the stage of framing issues, and not merely any procedural listing date.

(e) The Court also observed that procedural law must advance justice rather than defeat it. While the tenant had not strictly adhered to timelines and repeated defaults could not be ignored, the delay was not shown to be wholly contumacious or unexplained.

(f) At the same time, the Court found that the High Court had also failed to reconcile its earlier conditional order with the later extension of time granted to the tenant. Both courts therefore failed to comprehensively examine the matter in its proper legal perspective.

Held
The orders of the Trial Court and the Allahabad High Court were set aside. The matter was remanded to the Trial Court for fresh consideration of the application under Order XV Rule 5 CPC after determining:
(i) the “first date of hearing”;
(ii) whether there was substantial compliance; and
(iii) whether the default was wilful or bona fide.

Ratio
Before striking off a tenant’s defence under Order XV Rule 5 CPC, the court must determine the true “first date of hearing,” assess substantial compliance, and examine whether the default was wilful, since the provision confers judicial discretion and imposes a drastic penal consequence. 

Case Details
Citation: 2026 INSC 492
Decided on: 15 May 2026
Case Title: Dharmendra Kalra & Others v. Kulvinder Singh Bhatia
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: Prasanna B. Varale, J. and S.V.N. Bhatti, J.